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1 Introduction
This paper builds on an existing notion of group responsibility in [2] and proposes two ways to define
the degree of group responsibility: structural and functional degrees of responsibility. These notions
measure the potential responsibilities of (agent) groups for avoiding a state of affairs. According to
these notions, a degree of responsibility for a state of affairs can be assigned to a group of agents if, and
to the extent that, the group has the potential to preclude the state of affairs.
2 Preliminaries
In this work, the behaviour of the multi-agent system is modelled in a Concurrent Game Structure (CGS)
[1] which is a tupleM = (N,Q,Act, d, o), whereN = {1, . . . , k} is a set of agents, Q is a set of states,
Act is a set of actions, function d : N × Q → P(Act) identifies the set of available actions for each
agent in N at each state q ∈ Q, and o is a transition function that assigns a state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk)
to a state q and an action profile (α1, . . . , αk) such that all k agents in N choose actions in the action
profile respectively. Finally, a state of affairs refers to a set S ⊆ Q and S¯ denotes the set Q \ S. In the
rest of this paper, we say C ⊆ N is (weakly) q-responsible for S iff it can preclude S in q (see [2] for
formal details).
Let M be a multi-agent system, S a state of affairs in M , C ⊆ N an arbitrary group, and Cˆ be a
(weakly) q-responsible for S in M .
Definition 1 (Power measures) We say that the structural power difference of C and Cˆ in q ∈ Q with
respect to S in M , denoted by ΘS,Mq (Cˆ, C), is equal to cardinality of Cˆ\C. Moreover, we say that C
has a power acquisition sequence 〈α¯1, . . . , α¯n〉 in q ∈ Q for S in M iff for qi ∈ Q, o(qi, α¯i) = qi+1 for
1 ≤ i ≤ n such that q = q1 and qn+1 = q′ and C is (weakly) q′-responsible for S in M .
3 Structural Degree of Responsibility
In our conception of Structural Degree of Responsibility (SDR), we say that any (agent) group that
shares members with the responsible groups, should be assigned a degree of responsibility that reflects
its proportional contribution to the responsible groups. Accordingly, the relative size of a group and its
share in the responsible groups for the state of affairs are substantial parameters in our formulation of the
structural responsibility degree. We would like to emphasize that this concept of responsibility degree
is supported by the fact that beneficiary parties, e.g., lobbyists in the political context, do proportionally
invest their limited resources on the groups that can play a role in some key decisions.
Definition 2 (Structural degree of responsibility) LetWS,Mq denote the set of all (weakly) q-responsible
groups for state of affairs S in multi-agent system M , and C ⊆ N be an arbitrary group. In case
1The full version of this paper appears in [4].
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WS,Mq = ∅, the structural degree of q-responsibility of any C for S in M is undefined; otherwise, the
structural degree of q-responsibility of C for S in M denoted SDRS,Mq (C), is defined as follows:
SDRS,Mq (C) = max
Cˆ∈WS,Mq
({i | i = 1− Θ
S,M
q (Cˆ, C)
| Cˆ | })
Intuitively, SDRS,Mq (C) measures the highest contribution of a groupC in a (weakly) q-responsible
Cˆ for S. Hence, structural degree of responsibility is in range of [0, 1].
4 Functional Degree of Responsibility
Functional Degree of Responsibility (FDR) addresses the dynamics of preclusive power of a group
of agents (in the sense of [3]) with respect to a given state of affairs. We deem that a reasonable
differentiation could be made between the groups which do have the chance of acquiring the preclusive
power and those they do not have any chance of power acquisition. This notion addresses the eventuality
of a state in which a group possesses the preclusive power regarding the state of affairs. This degree is
formulated based on the notion of power acquisition sequence (Definition 1) by tracing the number of
necessary state transitions from a source state, in order to reach a state in which the group in question is
responsible for the state of affairs.
Definition 3 (Functional degree of responsibility) Let PS,Mq (C) denote the set of all power acquisi-
tion sequences of C ⊆ N in q for S in M . Let also ` = min
k∈PS,Mq (C)
({i | i = length(k)}) be the length
of a shortest power acquisition sequence. The functional degree of q-responsibility of C for S in M ,
denoted by FDRS,Mq (C), is defined as follows:
FDRS,Mq (C) =
{
0 if PS,Mq (C) = ∅
1
(`+1) otherwise
The notion of FDRS,Mq (C) is formulated based on the minimum length of power acquisition se-
quences, which taken to be 0 if C is a (weakly) q-responsible for S. Hence, the functional degree of
q-responsibility of such a C for S is equal to 1. If there exists no power acquisition sequence for C,
then the minimum length of a power acquisition sequence is taken to be∞ and the functional degree of
q-responsibility of C for S becomes 0. In other cases FDRS,Mq (C) is strictly between 0 and 1.
5 Conclusion
The proposed notions can be used as a tool for analyzing the potential responsibility of agent groups
towards a state of affairs. In our approach, the structural degree of responsibility captures the respon-
sibility of an agent group based on the accumulated preclusive power of the included agents while the
functional degree of responsibility captures the responsibility of a group of agents due to the potentiality
of reaching a state in which it has the preclusive power. In the full version of the paper, we specify
pertinent properties of the notions and consider additional semantics.
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